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Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of fiscal illusion by estimating an index 
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illusion and develops an index of fiscal illusion. It concludes that the chief deterninants for the 
deployment of fiscal illusion strategies are the share of self-employment on total employment, 
the educational level of citizens, and the size of tax burden. At the same time, policy makers 
attempt to ‘conceal’ the real tax burden by means of debt illusion, fiscal drag, wage 
withholding taxes, as well as taxes on labour. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the many consequences of the protracted global financial crisis has been a stark realisation that 
there is a pressing need for greater accountability in public finance, especially in terms of public sector 
indebtedness (Tirole 2011). In particular, it is widely recognised that governments should offer 
transparent reports of revenue-raising and expenditure activities at the national level, as well as for the 
different levels of government in multi-tiered systems. In this context, the question of fiscal illusion 
can play a pivotal role since the real costs of public sector activity may not be apparent to citizens. 
Fiscal illusion refers to a systematic misperception of fiscal parameters and an associated pattern of 
over- and under-estimation of expenditure and taxation liabilities which is persistent, recurring and 
consistent through time and which gives rise to biases in budgetary decisions at all levels of 
government. Fiscal illusion can take many forms. For instance, tax illusion might arise from the use of 
debt to finance centrsal government budget deficits since taxpayers might be unaware of the full tax 
liabilities they will incurr in future.  
A useful, albeit nascent, empirical approach to this problem resides in the estimation of indexes of 
fiscal illusion (see, for instance, Mourão 2008) or its converse in transparency indexes (see, for 
example, Alt and Lassen 2006). Well-constructed indexes of this kind allow for international 
comparisons of different countries. They are thus a useful tool for public policy makers since they 
provide a means of adjuding the relative importance of fiscal illusion in a given polity. This paper falls 
squarely into this embryonic empirical tradition. 
A robustly constructed index of fiscal illusion has several distinct benefits. In the first place, the 
construction of an index of this kind requires careful empirical assessment of the different putative 
factors involved in fiscal illusion. An empirical excercise along these lines is valuable from a policy 
perspective because it serves as a method of discovering which factors are important and which are 
extraneous to fiscal illusion. Secondly, the process of carefully constructing an index obliges us to 
acquire numerical estimates of the relative importance of those factors that do influence fiscal illusion, 
a useful line inquiry in its own right. Thirdly, a comparative index of fiscal illusion may serve to alert 
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the public and policy makers alike not only as to the acuteness of the problem, but also where a given 
country stands in relation to its trading partners. Transparency of this kind may, in itself, provoke a 
more effective policy response to disprelling or at least ameliorating fiscal illusion. 
We employ a data drawn from sample of 28 European countries for a period fourteen years, extending 
from 1995 to 2008, in order to investigate structural incentives for deploying methods of obscuring the 
real costs of government, to develop several indicators of fiscal illusion, and then to construct an index 
of fiscal illusion for the sample of European countries. The empirical analysis employs Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM) and the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) modelling 
techniques.  
The paper is itself divided into three main parts. Section 2 provides a brief review of the empirical 
analysis of fiscal illusion. Section 3 discusses the data, models and results of the empirical estimations 
in three discrete components: sub-section 3.1 outlines the SEM and the MIMIC methodologies adopted 
in the estimation procedures, as well as the models used; sub-section 3.2 considers the problem of the 
most apposite explanatory variables and plausible a priori expectations; and sub-section 3.3 details the 
procedures followed for constructing the index of fiscal illusion. The paper ends in section 4 with some 
short concluding comments. 
2. Approaches to Fiscal Illusion 
In essence, the fiscal illusion hypothesis holds that, in real world democratic polities, the 
benefits and costs of governmental activity may be misconstrued by citizens, who will 
typically under-estimate the costs involved. Although the intellectual genesis of this 
proposition goes back at least as far as J. R. McCulloch (1845) in his Treatise on the Practical 
Influence of Taxation and the Funding System, Puviani (1903) has dominated the traditional 
approach to fiscal illusion, which has been developed further by other scholars, most notably 
Buchanan (1967) and Wagner (1976), writing in the same tradition.  
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For much of its history the empirical analysis of fiscal illusion has been largely directed at 
revenue-raising rather with public expenditure activities or public regulation. Wagner (1976) 
has identified five specific hypotheses traditionally investigated in the empirical analysis of 
fiscal illusion: (a) the revenue-complexity hypothesis, where the misperception of the tax/price 
stems from the fragmentation of the revenue system; (b) the revenue-elasticity hypothesis,  
where growth in revenue is associated with income elastic forms of taxation; (c) the flypaper 
effect, where lump-sum intergovernmental grants have a stimulatory effect on public 
expenditure; (d) the renter illusion hypothesis, where fiscal illusion is depends on the extent of 
property ownership in a given jurisdiction; and (e) the debt illusion hypothesis, where public 
awareness of the extent public expenditure depends more on current taxation than debt 
financing.  These hypotheses essentially explore the mechanisms which can explain the 
existence of fiscal illusion.  Dollery and Worthington (1996) have provided a detailed survey 
of empirical work on fiscal illusion.  
In addition to this established corpus of work, a new embryonic strand of the empirical 
literature has drawn on the original insights developed by Puviani (1903), which centred on 
the notion that political elites may deliberately design a fiscal system so as to conceal the real 
burden it imposes and thus minimise resistance to such revenue-raising. In essence, this 
nascent approach seeks to identify the fiscal instruments which best facilitate ‘obscuring’ the 
real fiscal burden. Following on the work of Puviani (1903), Buchanan (1967) 
consideredvarious methods which can be deployed to enhance the opacity of the fiscal system 
degree of fiscal illusion, such as revenue-raising through a complex array of many taxes rather 
a few significant levies, and the exploitation of political events as ‘scare tactics’ to justify 
additional imposts. In an empirical application of this line of thought, these factors can be 
embodied in Herfindahl-type indexes, which can facilitate the study the fiscal illusion by 
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examining its composite explanatory variables. The present paper falls squarely in this 
tradition. 
In an analysis of the intellectual foundations for this approach, Mourão (2008) has observed 
that empirical analysis along these lines, which constructs fiscal illusion indexes, ‘allows for 
research on the role of illusory practices by politicians to achieve their particular aims 
deceiving specific electorates’. In addition, it demonstrates that ‘despite being an old idea, 
primarily suggested in 1903, fiscal illusion is a phenomenon that persists in democratic 
countries, conditioning their economies, mainly their fiscal aggregates’. Mourão (2008) has 
provided a helpful synopsis of the relevant literature. The resulting indexes of fiscal illusion 
can provide useful ‘benchmarks’ for evaluating the comparative performance of different 
democratic countries, discerning long-run trends, and uncovering good governance practices 
in minimising fiscal illusion. The present paper seeks to contribute to this embryonic empirical 
literature (Dell’Anno and Mourão 2012) by developing a fiscal illusion index. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology, model specification and construction of the 
fiscal illusion index. With respect to the country sample, the (unbalanced) panel used for 
estimating MIMIC model consists of a cross-section of 28 countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) over a 14 
year period (1995-2008) using 10 variables for a total of 3778 observations. All variables, 
except the Free Press Index, are measured as percentage points. Definitions and data sources 
are provided in Appendix A. 
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The empirical analysis of fiscal illusion follows the Dell’Anno and Mourão (2012) approach. 
The main methodological contribution of this paper lies in the application of robust estimators 
to deal with the problem of non-normality (Jöreskog et al. 2000). A Robust Maximum 
Likelihhod empoirical approach is considered a superior strategy to include non-normality in  
moderate sample size work. The second contribution derives from the structure of dataset, 
which has a more wide-ranging time dimension than Dell’Anno and Mourão (2012). It thus 
allows us to estimate the dynamics of the fiscal illusion process in the European Union1 
instead of simple average scores for each country. 
3.1 The SEM and the MIMIC approach  
Structural Equation Models are based on statistical relationships among latent (i.e. 
unobservable) and manifest (i.e. observable) variables. The SEM approach is an extension of 
the general linear model that simultaneously estimates relationships between multiple 
independent, dependent and latent variables. In this sense, the SEM includes factor analysis 
and multivariate regression as special cases. It thus integrates two important aspects of 
economic analysis: (a) variable measurability and observability and (b) the causal relationship 
between them.  
In this paper, a special case of the SEM is considered: the Multiple Indicators and Multiple 
Causes model. The MIMIC model derived its name from Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975). It 
was introduced into economic analysis by Weck-Hannemann (1983) and it has been applied to 
the analysis of shadow economies.2  
                                                 
1
 In the 1995, the European Union was enlarged to 15 member states. 
2
 Following Weck (1983), other economists have used this approach in the statistical analysis of the 
shadow economy, including Frey and Weck–Hannemann (1984), Schneider (2005), Dell’Anno (2007), 
Dell’Anno et al. (2007) and Dell’Anno and Solomon (2008). 
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The measurement model defines the relations between a latent variable (fiscal illusion) and its 
indicators and a structural model which specifies the casual relationships between a latent 
variable and its causes. The measurement equation in matrix notation is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 11 d dd
y Fλ ε
×× ××
= +
  ,                        (1) 
 
where the latent variable (F) determines linearly, subject to disturbances ( )1 2, ,... dε ε ε ε′ = , a 
set of d endogenous indicators ( )1 2, , , dy y y y ′′ = … . The covariance matrix of the measurement 
errors, ε , is given by the matrix3 εΘ . Furthermore, λ is a ( )1d ×  column vector of regression 
coefficients that relate y  to F.  
Equation 2 is a structural equation, which shows that the unobserved variable F is determined 
linearly by the x  set of exogenous causes ( )1 2, , , cx x x… . Because the structural equation model 
only partially explains the latent variable, the structural disturbance error term, ζ , represents 
the unexplained component. β is a ( )1 c×  vector of structural coefficients describing the 
“causal” relationship between F and its causes. In matrix notation, it is written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 1 1cc
F xβ ζ
× ×× ×
′= + .     (2) 
Without loss of generality, all of the variables are considered to carry zero expectations. 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0E F E x E y = = =  , and the variance of the structural disturbance term ζ  is 
abbreviated by Ψ . The MIMIC model also assumes that (a) ( ) ( ) 0E Eζ ε= =  error terms do 
not correlate with the causes ( ) 0E xζ =  ; (b) the error terms in the measurement model do 
                                                 
3
 In the standard MIMIC model (Jöreskog and Goldberger 1975), the measurement errors are assumed 
to be independent of each other, but this restriction could be relaxed (Stapleton 1978). In this analysis, 
several covariances between indicators are relaxed since they are empirically and theoretically 
plausible. Figure 1 shows some of these estimated covariances. 
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not correlate either with the causes ( ) 0E xε ′ =   or with the (c) latent variable ( ) 0E Fε ′ =  ; 
and, finally, (d) measurement errors do not correlate with structural disturbances 
( ) 0E εζ =  . 
From equations (1) and (2) and the use of the definitions the MIMIC model can be solved for 
the reduced form as a function of the observable variables x  and y , as shown in equation 3: 
y x z′= Π + ,      (3) 
where λβ ′Π =  is a c d×  reduced-form coefficients matrix and has rank one expressed in 
terms of c and d elements of structural and measurement coefficients; and z λζ ε= +  is a 
reduced-form disturbance vector with ( )0,z Ω∼ , where the reduced form of the covariance 
matrix is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1d d d d d dε
λ λ
× ×× × ×
′Ω = Ψ + Θ .     (4) 
Assuming multivariate normality, the maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters are 
calculated by minimizing the discrepancy between the empirical covariance matrix, S, and the 
covariance matrix implied by the model Ω (Jöreskog 1967):  
( ) ( )1ln lnMLF tr S S d c−= Ω + Ω − − + ,     (5) 
where "|.|" indicates the determinant of a matrix, tr indicates the trace, d is the number of 
observed endogenous indicators (y), and c is the number of observed exogenous causes (x). 
The necessary condition for identification is that the number of structural parameters should 
be equal to the number of reduced-form parameters. An observation of the reduced-form 
parameters shows that unique solutions to the structural parameters λ  and β  cannot be 
obtained from the reduced-form model. This situation exists because altering the scale of F 
yields an infinite number of solutions to λ  and β  from the same reduced-form solution. This 
 9 
inability to obtain unique solutions to λ  and β  causes an identification problem, which can 
be resolved by fixing the scale of the unobserved variable. This is the sufficient condition for 
identification, which can be achieved by constraining one of the paths from the latent variable 
to one of its indicator (reference) variables, by assigning the value of 1.0 to this path. This 
procedure anchors the latent variable to the reference indicator.4  
In this analysis, the coefficient of the measurement equation is selected following two criteria. 
From a statistical point of view, evaluating the measurement equations is preferable to 
selecting the regression with the highest R2 among alternative MIMIC specifications. From an 
economic perspective, it is desirable to opt for the indicator of fiscal illusion with the most 
sound theoretical justification. According to both criteria, the best choice is to fix as  reference 
variable with the (positive) coefficient of the equation that regresses the latent variable on the 
public debt as a percentage of GDP (λ2=1). However, to check robustness of results to alterantive 
indicators we also use as reference variable the “Withholding taxes from wages” (λ6=1).5 
3.2 Observable structural causes and indicators of fiscal illusion 
As we have seen, growing literature exists on the empirical analysis of strategies to distort 
taxpayers’ perception of the tax burden (Dollery and Worthington 1996). Combining this 
literature with data availability, we specify the MIMIC model. The rationale behind the 
selection of the observed variable is a key issue for our empirical approach. As stated by 
Duncan (1975), the meaning of the latent variable, and hence the reliability of the estimates of 
the fiscal illusion index, depend on how comprehensively the causal and indicator variables 
correspond to the intended content of the latent variable. In particular, taking into account data 
availability, four main structural causes which enhance the efficacy of fiscal illusion, and five 
                                                 
4
 An alternative is to fix the variance of the unobserved variable F at unity. 
5
  We find that estimated parameters are robust. 
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main categories of policies capable of distorting taxpayers’ perceptions of their tax burdens, 
are chosen.  
With respect to possible “causes”, they are hypothesized to make it easier for a policy maker 
to exploit, with a greater efficacy, fiscal illusion mechanisms. In particular, the structural 
model includes the relationships between fiscal illusion (F) and the following variables: self-
employment (x1); political pressures and controls on media content (x2); tertiary school 
enrolment (x3) and the tax burden (x4). We now consider each of these in turn: 
X1 Self-employment: The first cause is argued to be the ratio between self-employed workers 
and the total employed population. Following Fasiani (1941), the higher the ratio, the more 
visible the tax burden because more “active” tax compliance is required for these workers than 
for employees ceteris paribus. This result occurs because, for the self-employed, the system of 
withholding income tax allows for discretionary behaviour. A further reason to support a 
positive sign for this coefficient is related to the shadow economy. Self-employed persons are 
involved in tax evasion and underground economic activities more than employees (see, for 
instance, Dell’Anno et al., 2007). Thus, in countries with a higher share of self-employment, 
government has greater incentives to create misperceptions of the tax burden in order to 
reduce tax evasion and/or to bring those economic activities back into the official economy 
(i.e. by reducing the costs of operating officially). 
H1: We expect the self-employment rate to be positively correlated with fiscal illusion 
because self-employed persons have both a greater awareness of tax burden and they may 
operate (or move into) in the unofficial “shadow” economy. Thus higher self-employment 
rates increase policy maker’s incentives to distort the perception of the tax burden (β1>0). 
X2 Political pressures and controls on media content: The second observed variable that may 
improve the efficacy of fiscal illusion strategies are political pressures and controls on media 
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content, as estimated by Freedom House. This variable takes into account the possibility of 
citizens not getting distorted information about expenditure and tax revenue policies. It seems 
reasonable that, the greater the freedom of the media from political pressure (i.e. the lower the 
index score), the lower fiscal illusion.  
H2: We expect the political pressures and controls on media content to be positively 
correlated to fiscal illusion because it becomes an easier task for a policy maker to distort the 
perception of the tax burden if the media do not provide individuals’ with accurate 
information (β2>0). 
X3 Tertiary school enrolment: The third potential cause of fiscal illusion takes into account the 
ability of a society to correctly evaluate beneficiaries of both tax reforms and public 
expenditure programs. In assuming that this ability can be inferred from the education level of 
citizens, we consider the percentage of people in the total population who have completed 
tertiary education.  
H3: We expect the level of education to be negatively correlated to fiscal illusion because 
higher education reduces the effectiveness of the fiscal illusion policies. Thus, policy makers 
have less incentive to distort taxpayers’ perceptions (β3<0). 
X4 Tax burden: Finally, we include tax revenue as percentage of GDP as a proxy for the 
policy maker’s need to reduce the perception of tax pressure. The relationship between 
taxation and fiscal illusion is not regarded as a unidirectional causal relationship as these 
variables are endogenously determined. On one hand, taxpayers paying higher taxes (usually) 
oppose further increases in taxation. Therefore policy makers have a greater  inducement to 
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hide the tax burden. On the other hand, greater  fiscal illusion makes easier for politicians to 
increase the tax burden, and thus the causal relationship works in reverse.6  
H4: We expect the tax burden to be positively correlated with fiscal illusion because a higher 
(effective) tax burden encourages a government to adopt tax policies aimed at increasing fiscal 
illusion and greater fiscal illusion decreases the electoral cost of larger tax revenues (β4>0). 
With respect to the measurement model, it includes some of the most common strategies to 
reduce citizens’ perceptions of their tax burdens. From a statistical point of view, the number 
of indicators has a relevant role in assigning reliability to the SEM approach. It is well known 
that unacceptable solutions (i.e. negative variance estimates, also known as “Heywood cases”) 
can occur frequently in SEM if a sufficient number of good indicators is not provided. To take 
into account this caveat, up to six alternative observable indicators of fiscal illusion are 
included in the model. In particular, the measurement model links the following six indicators 
to the unobservable variable: y1 - inflation rate (fiscal drag); y2 - public debt (Ricardian 
equivalence hypothesis); y3  - ratio between indirect and direct tax revenues (Mill’s 
hypothesis);  y4 - Herfindahl index of revenue (complexity of tax system); y5 - Implicit tax rate 
on labour and y6 - Withholding tax on labour income (i.e. size and visibility of withholding tax 
on wages and salary income, respectively). We briefly examine each of these in turn: 
Y1 Inflation rate: This indicator takes into account misperception of the tax burden due to 
monetary illusion. In this case, ruling elites may stimulate price inflation to devalue the claims 
of creditors of the state (and/or in a progressive tax system), with rising nominal earnings 
                                                 
6
 This evidence may suggest that tax revenue should be included in the model among both the causes 
and indicators of the latent variable. However, it cannot be done due to perfect collinearity. Thus we 
checked information loss as consequence of excluding tax revenue as potential indicator of fiscal 
illusion. Regressing the tax burden on the existing six indicators, we found that four of six indicators 
have statistically significant coefficients and explain about 20% of the tax revenue variance. In this 
sense, the exclusion of tax revenue from measurement model is partially accounted for by these 
variables. 
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resulting in higher real tax burdens (i.e. fiscal drag). To encompass this method of 
implementing fiscal illusion, we include the annual average rate of change of harmonized 
indices of consumer prices.  
H5: We expect the inflation rate to be positively correlated to fiscal illusion because 
individuals do not (immediately) realise increased tax burdens due to increased prices (λ1>0). 
Y2 Public Debt: A common strategy to create fiscal illusion is to use public debt. The 
argument here is that taxpayers are more likely to perceive the cost of public programs if they 
pay for them through current taxation than if tax liabilities are deferred through public-sector 
borrowing (Oates 1988).  
H6: We expect public debt to be positively correlated with fiscal illusion because the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis does not hold (λ2>0). 
Y3 Tax complexity: The third indicator of misperceptions of tax liabilities is the complexity of 
the tax system. Following Wagner (1976), we estimate the Herfindahl index of the revenue 
system (H). A normalized version of H-index is computed in order to range the scores from 0 
to 100. In symbolic terms: * 1 11 *100H H
n n
     
= − −     
     
, where 2
1
n
i
i
H t
=
=∑ , ti is the revenue 
share of tax i in the tax system, and n is the number of taxes.7  For this proxy, a higher value 
means a less complex revenue system. 
H7: We expect the Herfindahl index to be negatively correlated to fiscal illusion because, 
other things equal, the more complicated the revenue system, the more likely it is that the 
taxpayer will underestimate the tax burden (λ3< 0). 
                                                 
7
 According to Oates (1988), the results from the various studies of the revenue-complexity hypothesis 
are mixed. For instance Clotfelter (1976) found no evidence that the Herfindahl index affects fiscal 
illusion. Moreover, Pommerehne and Schneider (1978); Dollery and Worthington (1999); Sausgruber 
and Tyran (2005); Mourão (2008), Dell’Anno and Mourão (2012) find evidence supporting this 
hypothesis. 
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Y4 Share of indirect taxation: The third variable included as indicator of fiscal illusion is the 
"Mill hypothesis", according to which the fiscal extraction through indirect taxation is 
underestimated compared to direct taxation, because it is less visible to the taxpayers. The 
“Mill' hypothesis” (1848), stressed by Schmölders (1960) and Buchanan (1967), represents one of 
the most common forms by which the policy maker reduces the perceived sacrifice of the taxpayers.  
H8: We expect the share of indirect taxation to be positively correlated with fiscal illusion 
because, the more tax revenue is concealed in market prices, the more likely it is that the 
taxpayer will underestimate the tax burden (λ4> 0). 
The fifth category of indicators is related to withholding taxes on wages and salary income. 
Withholding taxes are a very common method of collecting income taxes. Each pay period an 
employer is required to withhold tax from each employee's gross salary and send it to the 
public exchequer. According to the literature (Enrick 1964; Wagstaff 1965; Berry and Lowery 
1987), a revenue system heavily reliant on withholding taxes from wages leads taxpayers to 
underestimate their tax burdens. For Buchanan (1967), the withholding of income for tax 
payments is the first “modern” tool for generating (optimistic) illusions. Whilst withholding 
has the advantage of simplifying tax compliance, it does not allow the worker to fully perceive 
the percentage of their income withheld, thereby limiting their ability to determine their 
degree of participation in the funding of public goods and services.  
To take into account this phenomenon, two variables are included: the (implicit) tax rate on 
labour and the ratio between taxes on labour of which on employed paid by employers and 
taxes on labour of which on employed paid by employees.  
Y5 Tax rate on labour. H9: We expect the tax rate on labour to be positively correlated with 
fiscal illusion because the larger is the tax revenue collected from labour, greater is the 
relevance of the withholding system (λ5>0).  
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Y6 Withholding taxes from wages. H10: We expect withholding taxes from wages to be 
positively correlated with fiscal illusion becuause a higher value of the ratio means less visible 
taxation (λ6>0).  
Figure 1 shows the path diagram of the most inclusive MIMIC model specification. It includes 
four “Causes” - 1 latent variable – and six “Indicators” (hereinafter termed MIMIC 4-1-6)8.  
 
Figure 1: Path Diagram MIMIC 4-1-6 
 
Once we have specified the model according to economic theory, the second step is to test the 
presence of unit roots in the data. Following Granger and Newbold (1974), it is well 
established that the non-stationarity of variables can lead to spurious regressions. As a result, 
we carried out unit root tests on variables to establish whether the variables were stationary or 
not. According to Levin and Lin (1993), testing for the unit root in panel framework is more 
powerful compared to performing a separate unit root test for each individual time series. We 
                                                 
8
 The arrows that link some indicators and some causes indicate that the MIMIC model estimates 
covariances among structural and measurement errors. The rationale for these covariances is 
theoretically based. 
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apply the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test (Levin et al. 2002), the Fisher-ADF test and the Fisher-PP 
test (Maddala and Wu 1999; Choi 2001). Table 1 reports the results of panel unit root tests. 
Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests  
 Variable Lag length (test specification) 
Levin, Lin & Chu§ 
t-statistic 
ADF–Fisher° 
Chi-square 
PP–Fisher° 
Chi-square 
X1 Self-employment rate 
0 to 1 
(trends + intercepts) 
-6.96*** 
(0.000) 
82.40** 
(0.012) 
66.13 
(0.167) 
X2 
Political control of 
media 
0 to 2 
(intercepts) 
-5.51*** 
(0.000) 
114.00*** 
(0.000) 
199.31*** 
(0.000) 
X3 Tertiary Education 
0 to 1 
(trends + intercept) 
-6.61*** 
(0.000) 
69.26 
(0.110) 
66.44 
(0.160) 
X4 
Revenue  
in % of GDP 
0 to 2 
(intercepts) 
-4.54*** 
(0.000) 
99.36*** 
(0.000) 
71.82* 
(0.076) 
Y1 Inflation rate 
0 to 1 
(intercepts) 
-8.65*** 
(0.000) 
115.08*** 
(0.000) 
130.80*** 
(0.000) 
Y2 
Public Debt  
in % of GDP 
0 to 1 
(trends+ intercepts) 
-3.785*** 
(0.000) 
73.31* 
(0.060) 
71.35* 
(0.081) 
Y3 
Herfindahl index of tax 
revenue 
0 to 2 
(trends+intercepts) 
-4.49*** 
(0.000) 
99.94*** 
(0.000) 
93.50*** 
(0.000) 
Y4 Ind Taxes/dir taxes 
0 to 2 
(intercepts) 
-4.06*** 
(0.000) 
78.36** 
(0.026) 
58.58 
(0.381) 
Y5 
Taxes on labour  
in % of GDP 
0 to 1 
(trends+ intercepts) 
-3.36*** 
(0.000) 
60.67 
(0.311) 
75.41** 
(0.043) 
Y6 
Withholding taxes from 
wages 
0 to 1 
(trends+ intercepts) 
-6.33*** 
(0.000) 
84.08*** 
(0.009) 
83.33** 
(0.010) 
§Null Hypothesis: Unit root (assumes common unit root process); °Null Hypothesis: Unit root 
(assumes individual unit root process). ***Denotes significant at 1% level; **Denotes significant at 5% 
level; *Denotes significant at 10% level. P-values are in parenthesis. The lag length is based on Akaike 
information criterion. Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel are applied. 
 
Based on the Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) tests, we conclude that these series do not have a common 
unit root. Looking at the presence of individual unit root, ADF and PP tests reveal that all 
variables, except the tertiary education and public debt, are stationary. 
The final step to make SEM approach suitable to the panel structure of the data set is to 
transform observed variables as deviations from the mean values of the respective countries 
calculated over the sample period. This manipulation verifies the hypothesis that all of the 
variables have zero expectations. ( ) ( ) ( ) 0E F E x E y = = =  , since the variables have the 
same mean (zero) for each country. This method makes SEM amenable to analysing 
heterogeneity across cross-sectional units in the MIMIC model. This approach is motivated by 
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the relevance of country fixed effects in our model.9 According to this analysis, the deviations 
from the means of countries are estimated as follows: 
( )*jit jit jix x x= − ; ( )*jit jit jiy y y= − ,     (6) 
where j = 1, 2,…, 10 indicates the observed causes and indicators variables; i = 1, 2,…, 28 
denotes the countries; and t = 1995, 2001,…, 2008 specifies the time period. Table 2 shows 
the estimates of alternative MIMIC specifications. 
By testing multivariate normality, we find that this hypothesis does not hold in our models. 
Thus maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of standard errors and chi-squares may be 
incorrect. In these instances, it may be best to use weighted least squares (WLS). This method 
requires a very large sample so that the asymptotic covariance matrix of the sample can be 
estimated accurately. However if the sample size is not sufficiently large, the WLS estimator 
will perform less satisfactorily  than ML (Muthén and Kaplan, 1985, 1992). According to 
Olsson et al. (2000), WLS provide estimates and fit indexes close to the those obtained for ML 
only for sample sizes larger than 1000. As our sample has less than 350 cases, we consider 
WLS estimates as a robustness check on ML only. Other approaches to non-multivariate 
normality have been proposed by Jöreskog et al. (2000). One approach is to normalize the 
variables before analysis through normal scores (NS-ML). Asecond approach is to use scaled 
chi-square and “robust” standard errors employing the method developed by Satorra and 
Bentler (1994), known as the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimator (RML). According to 
Hu et al. (1992) and Curran et al. (1996), RML is the best approach to dealing with 
nonnormality in small samples (i.e. lower than 500).  
Table 2 shows parameters estimated for alternative MIMIC specifications and estimators.10  
                                                 
9
 To support this choice we apply the following stepwise approach: 1) Factor analysis is applied to 
estimate the scores of latent variable on the measurement model; 2) the factors used to explain the 
covariance structure of the observed data are unobserved, but we estimated them from the loadings and 
observable data. These factor score estimates are used as substitutes for the higher-dimensional 
observed data; 3) Estimated factor scores are used as dependent variables for three panel regressions in 
which the independent variables are the four “causes” of MIMIC model (structural equation). For each 
of these regressions we performed Redundant Fixed effects tests. According to Likelihood tests, the 
cross-country fixed effect are statistically significant. This implies that cross-unit fixed effects have to 
be included in the model specification.  
10
  We estimated several MIMIC specifications to check the robustness of the index with different sets 
of observed variables. The estimates proved robust. Omitted outputs will be provided by authors upon 
request. 
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Table 2: MIMIC models and parameter estimates 
 
4-1-6a 4-1-6b 4-1-5 3-1-5 
Causes ML RML NS-ML WLS ML RML NS-ML DWLS1 ML RML NS-ML WLS ML RML NS-ML WLS 
Self-employment 
Rate 
0.82* 
(4.48) 
1.00* 
(4.58) 
1.00* 
(5.24) 
0.48 
(1.36) 
1.15* 
(4.44) 
0.79* 
(2.60) 
0.79* 
(4.22) 
0.55 
(1.73) 
0.94* 
(4.75) 
1.00* 
(4.64) 
1.00* 
(5.44) 
0.65 
(1.90) 
1.07* 
(5.07) 
1.02* 
(4.75) 
1.02* 
(5.52) 
0.60* 
(2.13) 
Political contr. of  
media 
0.24* 
(2.56) 
-0.03 
(-0.24) 
-0.03 
(-0.20) 
-0.13 
(-0.85) 
0.33* 
(2.55) 
0.02 
(-0.25) 
0.02 
(-0.20) 
0.05 
(0.36) 
0.18 
(1.77) 
0.04 
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
-0.14 
(-1.18) -- -- -- -- 
Tertiary Education -0.21
*
 
(-2.98) 
-0.30* 
(-2.85) 
-0.30* 
(-3.65) 
-0.38* 
(-3.81) 
-0.30* 
(-2.97) 
-0.24* 
(-2.56) 
-0.24* 
(-3.24) 
-0.24* 
(-2.27) 
-0.27* 
(-3.47) 
-0.27* 
(-2.65) 
-0.27* 
(-3.45) 
-0.36* 
(-4.14) 
-0.33* 
(-3.92) 
-0.27* 
(-2.66) 
-0.27* 
(-3.47) 
-0.29* 
(-3.45) 
Revenue in % of 
GDP 
0.54* 
(5.49) 
0.72* 
(5.24) 
0.72* 
(5.74) 
1.28* 
(3.45) 
0.76* 
(5.41) 
0.57* 
(3.33) 
0.57* 
(4.47) 
0.56 
(1.77) 
0.63* 
(5.97) 
0.71* 
(5.07) 
0.71* 
(5.88) 
0.97* 
(4.50) 
0.69* 
(6.27) 
0.72* 
(5.18) 
0.72* 
(5.98) 
0.85* 
(5.05) 
Indicators 
Inflation rate 0.98
*
 
(5.35) 
0.30* 
(2.34) 
0.30* 
(4.42) 
-0.02 
(-0.53) 
0.69* 
(5.97) 
0.38* 
(2.29) 
0.38* 
(3.95) 
0.21* 
(2.35) 
0.76* 
(5.11) 
0.33* 
(2.44) 
0.33* 
(4.55) 
0.65 
(1.90) 
0.66* 
(4.94) 
0.33* 
(2.43) 
0.33* 
(4.54) 
0.07 
(1.52) 
Public Debt in % 
of GDP 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.71* 
(5.85) 
1.26* 
(3.57) 
1.26* 
(5.18) 
1.15 
(1.78) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Herfindahl index 
of tax revenue 
0.07* 
(3.84) 
-0.01 
(-0.86) 
-0.01 
(-0.91) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(5.85) 
-0.02 
(-0.82) 
-0.02 
(-0.90) 
-0.03 
(-1.18) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Indirect Taxes/ 
direct taxes 
-1.15* 
(-3.78) 
-0.72* 
(-2.33) 
-0.72* 
(-3.09) 
-0.90* 
(-3.32) 
-0.82* 
(-3.53) 
-0.90 
(-1.90) 
-0.90* 
(-2.67) 
-0.66 
(-1.34) 
-0.82* 
(-3.05) 
-0.60 
(-1.85) 
-0.60* 
(-2.37) 
-0.14 
(-1.18) 
-0.71* 
(-2.91) 
-0.60 
(-1.84) 
-0.60* 
(-2.37) 
-0.65* 
(-2.20) 
Taxes on labour 
in % of GDP 
0.22* 
(6.59) 
0.19* 
(5.01) 
0.19* 
(7.21) 
0.16* 
(6.07) 
0.16* 
(7.50) 
0.24* 
(3.47) 
0.24* 
(5.60) 
0.31* 
(2.51) 
0.20* 
(7.00) 
0.21* 
(4.98) 
0.21* 
(7.03) 
0.36* 
(4.14) 
0.18* 
(7.00) 
0.20* 
(4.97) 
0.20* 
(7.04) 
0.22* 
(6.14) 
Withholding taxes 
from wages 
1.41* 
(5.85) 
0.79* 
(3.57) 
0.79* 
(5.18) 
-0.57* 
(-3.15) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.17* 
(5.63) 
0.86* 
(3.58) 
0.86* 
(5.17) 
0.97* 
(4.50) 
0.93* 
(5.24) 
0.85* 
(3.55) 
0.85* 
(5.15) 
0.13 
(0.60) 
Statistics 
χ2 275.03 127.40 203.11 138.60 275.03 127.40 203.11 128.21 155.12 68.39 113.52 51.63 131.44 91.34 91.34 33.18 
Degree freedom 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 17 17 17 17 13 13 13 13 
χ2(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
RMSEA 0.164 0.105 0.138 0.111 0.164 0.105 0.138 0.105 0.144 0.088 0.121 0.072 0.153 0.124 0.124 0.063 
R2 (Struct. eq.) 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.33 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.30 
Notes: t-Statistics are given in parentheses. * Means |t-statistic|>1.96. 
The degrees of freedom are determined using the expression 0.5(d+c)(d+c+1)–t, where “d” is the number of indicators, “c” is the number of causes, and “t” 
is the number of free parameters. 
1
 We report Diagonally Weighted Least Squares (DWLS), as WLS does not converge to proper solutions.
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χ
2
 is a classic goodness-of-fit measure to determine overall model fit. A small χ2 is a sign of a 
good model fit. However, the χ2 test is widely recognized to be problematic (Jöreskog 1969). 
It is sensitive to sample size, and it becomes more and more difficult to retain the null 
hypothesis as the number of cases increases. The χ2 test may also be invalid when multinormal 
distributional assumptions are violated, as in this analysis, leading to the rejection of good 
models or the retention of bad models. Due to these drawbacks of the χ2 test, many alternative 
fit statistics have been developed, one of the most widely used statistics being the Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) proposed by Steiger and Lind (1980). RMSEA 
incorporates a penalty function for poor model parsimony and thus becomes sensitive to the 
number of parameters estimated and relatively insensitive to sample size (Brown 2006). A rule 
of thumb is that RMSEA < 0.05 indicates a close approximate fit, values between 0.05 and 
0.08 suggest a reasonable error of approximation, and RMSEA > 0.10 suggests poor fit 
(Browne and Cudeck 1993). 
According to earlier results, the indexes of overall goodness of fit reveal a relatively poor fit 
with exception of 4-1-5 RML and 3-1-5-WLS. This result is explained by the fact that the 
variability of the indicators is not exclusively caused by the latent variable (fiscal illusion). 
The empirical evidence is provided by low values of the R2 for measurement equations 
(R2<0.40). Supplementary exogenous variables certainly affect to the latent variable in 
addition to the influence of fiscal illusion11. Accordingly, the goodness of fit statistics MIMIC 
4-1-5 RML is deemed the preferable specification. It has the best goodness of fit in term of R2 
for the structural equation (0.39) and lowest RMSEA (0.088). 
                                                 
11
 In regression analysis, the omission of relevant variables can lead to biased coefficient estimates. To 
take into account this issue, the correlations between errors of the different equations of the 
measurement and variables of the structural model are included in the model estimation. It implies we 
specify a non-diagonal covariance matrix of the measurement errors εΘ  and structural disturbances 
Ψ . 
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Estimated structural and measurement coefficients of this model have the expected signs, with 
exclusion of Herfindhal index of the complexity of tax system12 and the ratio between indirect 
and direct revenue13 that are statistically insignificant.  
   
3.3 Index of Fiscal Illusion  
In this sub-section, we consider the procedure for constructing the index of fiscal illusion. As 
a first step, the structural equation is applied to estimate the index of fiscal illusion, where jβ  
are structural coefficients reported in Table 2. 
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4it it it it itF x x x xβ β β β≈ + + +     (7) 
The next step is to normalize the index to have a range [0, 10]. This is obtained by subtracting 
the minimum value and dividing by the range of the index values across the countries. In 
symbolic form, the following equation is applied: 
( )
( ) ( )
,*
,,
min
10*
max min
it iti t
it
it iti ti t
F F
F
F F
∀ ∀
∀ ∀∀ ∀
−
=
−
.     (8) 
To verify the robustness of the index to the different MIMIC specifications in Table 3, 
correlations between the scores of the indexes of fiscal illusion are reported.  
                                                 
12
 Data on the revenue from each tax is not available. Therefore, as is usual in the literature on the 
Herfindahl index of tax revenue, we use diverse types of taxation instead of the number of different 
taxes. This procedure makes Herfindahl index far from being a perfect measure of tax complexity, 
since it does not account for the effective sources of tax complexity, but measures complexity through 
the proportions of revenue collected by diverse types of taxation (e.g. direct, excise, capital). It implies 
that two countries (A and B) with the same level of tax revenue, but different levels of tax complexity, 
have the same values of the Herfindahl index. It occurs, for instance, if country A collected tax through  
a single direct tax (or excise), while country B levies several direct taxes (or excises). It can explain the 
‘gap’ between theory and empirical evidence. 
13
 With the exception of MIMIC 4-1-6a RML. 
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 Table 3: Correlations among scores of Fiscal illusion index 
 
4-1-6a 
ML 
4-1-6a 
RML 
4-1-6b 
ML 
4-1-6b 
RML 
4-1-5 
ML 
4-1-5 
RML 
3-1-5 
ML 
3-1-5 
RML xy
r∑  
4-1-6a ML 1               7.9546 
4-1-6a RML 0.9884 1             7.9707 
4-1-6b ML 1.0000 0.9892 1           7.9589 
4-1-6b RML 0.9907 0.9998 0.9915 1         7.9719 
4-1-5 ML 0.9982 0.9951 0.9986 0.9966 1       7.9799 
4-1-5 RML 0.9938 0.9987 0.9942 0.9990 0.9974 1     7.9812 
3-1-5 ML 0.9912 0.9983 0.9920 0.9987 0.9972 0.9973 1   7.9705 
3-1-5 RML 0.9924 0.9988 0.9929 0.9988 0.9964 0.9999 0.9969 1 7.9740 
 
The anaysis of the matrix of correlations indicates that the index calculated by coefficients 
estimated with MIMIC 4-1-5 RML has the highest correlation with the other indexes of fiscal 
illusion. This means that this model is also the best choice to summarize the indexes estimated 
by alternative model specifications. 
Table 4 reports the dynamic of the normalized indices of fiscal illusion ( )*itF  of the 28 
countries in the sample. 
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Table 4: Estimates of the index of Fiscal Illusion (MIMIC 4-1-5) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average  
Austria 4.50 4.70 4.72 4.66 4.53 4.29 4.53 4.30 4.25 4.23 4.08 3.97 3.98 3.97 4.34 
Belgium 6.54 6.59 6.59 6.66 6.60 6.38 6.26 6.17 6.04 5.96 5.80 5.65 5.49 5.48 6.16 
Bulgaria           6.24 6.03 5.78 6.07 6.18 6.11 5.70 5.57 5.34 5.89 
Cyprus         7.83 8.25 8.33 8.15 8.71 8.75 9.09 8.86 9.69 4.52 8.22 
Czech Republic       2.51 2.81 2.86 2.89 2.99 3.28 3.45 3.18 3.07 3.10 2.89 3.00 
Denmark 3.92 3.93 3.92 3.77 3.12 3.38 3.06 2.97 3.21 3.24 3.48 3.22 3.26 2.95 3.39 
Estonia       1.11 0.82 0.58 0.23 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.00 0.06 0.41 0.16 0.39 
Finland 5.12 5.33 5.04 4.50 4.22 4.24 4.20 4.04 3.86 3.70 3.69 3.65 3.47 3.46 4.18 
France 4.69 4.88 4.73 4.66 4.71 4.43 4.24 4.05 3.99 4.04 4.06 4.05 3.88 3.76 4.30 
Germany 2.49 2.86 2.69   2.85 2.79 2.45 2.45 2.47 2.43 2.54 2.58 2.52 2.44 2.58 
Greece           10.00 9.55 9.28 8.86 8.47 8.58 8.50 8.50 8.50 8.92 
Hungary     4.96 4.46 4.26 5.08 4.07 3.78 3.42 3.19 2.95 2.70 2.90 2.88 3.72 
Ireland 5.68 5.44 5.27   4.46 4.19 3.69 3.79 3.70 3.87 3.68 3.70 3.63 3.33 4.19 
Italy 8.32 8.85 9.09 8.65 8.54 8.33 8.42 8.17 8.13 7.97 7.68 7.82 7.85 7.65 8.25 
Latvia       3.28 2.76 2.11 2.15 1.51 1.29 1.20 0.91 1.12 0.90 0.47 1.61 
Lithuania       3.70 3.54 3.22 3.06 3.04 2.97 2.63 2.24 2.04 1.57 1.10 2.65 
Luxembourg 3.78 3.75 3.96   2.87 2.90 3.02 2.87 2.79 2.41 2.25 1.85 1.77 1.67 2.76 
Malta           4.57 4.85 5.02 4.98 5.04 5.15 5.06 5.17 5.18 5.00 
Netherlands   4.74 4.51 4.39 4.30 4.11 3.79 3.63 3.51 3.47 3.52 3.66 3.51 3.54 3.90 
Norway   2.32 2.14 1.99 1.91 1.86 1.86 1.86 1.72 1.83 1.76 2.29 2.20 1.87 1.97 
Poland     6.37 5.85 5.70 5.31 5.35 5.41 5.04 4.72 4.63 4.44 4.35 4.14 5.11 
Portugal 6.08 6.24 6.22 6.39 6.30 6.31 6.30 6.28 6.28 5.90 5.91 5.86 5.88 5.75 6.12 
Romania         9.69 9.62 9.36 7.14 7.62 6.19 6.56 6.12 6.11 5.81 7.42 
Slovakia       1.65 1.52 1.28 1.13 1.09 1.27 1.47 1.51 1.11 1.12 1.17 1.30 
Slovenia   4.83 4.81 4.71 4.58 4.25 4.18 4.17 4.06 3.98 3.93 3.78 3.63 3.50 4.19 
Spain 6.22 6.08 5.77 5.63 5.54 5.35 5.17 5.13 4.98 4.95 4.92 4.88 4.88 4.24 5.27 
Sweden 3.35 3.36 3.61 3.63 3.60 3.55 2.93 2.55 2.48 2.54 2.60 2.77 2.62 2.36 3.00 
United Kingdom 3.89 3.83 3.68   3.22 3.14 3.10 2.84 2.75 2.79 2.84 2.96 2.89 3.13 3.16 
 Average 4.97 4.86 4.89 4.33 4.41 4.59 4.44 4.24 4.22 4.11 4.06 3.98 3.96 3.62   
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Figure 2 shows the ranking of countries according to the annual averages of the index over the 
period 1995-2008.  
Figure 2: Ranking of European Country (1995-2008) 
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From this analysis, we find evidence that Southern European policy makers usually exploit 
fiscal illusion stratagems to distort taxpayers’ perceptions of their tax burdens more than 
policy makers in other areas of Europe. In particular, Greece, Italy and Cyprus show the 
highest values among the 28 members of European Union. 
According to this ranking, those countries with the highest public indebtedness also have the 
highest levels of fiscal illusion. Thus, since we suspected that our index may simply be a 
proxy of the ratio of public debt on GDP, we estimated the correlation that exists between our 
index and this variable. Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the countries’ averages and the output 
of a bivariate regression without the outliers: Greece, Italy and Belgium. Considering that 
R2=0.19,14 we conclude that the estimated index of fiscal illusion, although positively 
correlated with national indebtedness, measures something else. 
                                                 
14
 Including outliers, R2=0.41. 
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                            Figure 3. Fiscal Illusion Vs Public Debt as % of GDP (Averages 1995-2008) 
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From this analysis, we also think that it is reasonable to deduce that our that our index does 
capture bona fide fiscal illusion rather than ‘creative accounting’ or some form of fiscal 
transparency. In any even, Beroth and Wolff (2008) and others have noted that these concepts 
cannot be defined with any degree of precision. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has sought to extend the embryonic empirical literature on the estimation of fiscal 
illusion indexes by extending the work of Dell’Anno and Mourão (2012). The results of this 
statistical exercise are not only interesting in themselves, but may also shed some light on the 
fiscal crisis in the Eurozone. In this regard, it can be argued that the insights which flow from 
the theory of fiscal illusion are not only helpful in understanding how serious levels of 
national indebtedness have arisen in most of the most heavily indebted European countries, as 
a consequence inter alia of public misperceptions surrounding the burden and benefits from 
public expenditure, but these insights can also assist in normative policy prescription. For 
 25 
instance, the fiscal illusion index developed in this paper may explain the observed pattern of 
indebtedness across the contemporary Eurozone. It would seem that those European countries 
most characterised by excessive public debt and income elastic forms of taxation rank highly 
in terms of our fiscal illusion index. In particular, the those countries with the highest levels of 
fiscal illusion in the index, such as Greece and Italy,  appear to have suffered more than other 
Eurozone nations as a consequence of the current financial crisis in terms of incapacity of 
their respective governments to stabilize their public budgets. 
At a more general level, in addition to fiscal illusion arising from tax illusion, Richard Wagner 
(2001) has stressed the importance of fiscal illusion in terms of its broader relationship to the 
pervasive spread of complex regulation in modern developed economies as a form of taxation 
and the costs associated with this regulation. From a public policy perspective, efficient ‘tax-
prices’ should reflect the ‘real costs’ of governmental activity in order for citizens to make 
rational judgements on the efficacy of public programs, including regulatory programs. To the 
extent that fiscal illusion surrounds public taxation, public expenditure and public regulation, 
this condition is not met. It follows that fiscal illusion indexes and other measures of fiscal 
illusion can inform public policy making by determining the extent to which fiscal illusion 
clouds public perceptions.  
Furthermore, the MIMIC model utilised in our paper underlines the complexity of the 
relationships of both the causes and the indicators, which seem to affect fiscal illusion. In a 
more general sense, this highlights the need for systematic statistical approaches, such as 
MIMIC modelling techniques, to be used in investigating the nature of latent phenomena.  
 26 
References 
Alt J, Lassen D  (2006) Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt In OECD Countries, European Economic 
Review, 50(6): 1403-1439. 
Beroth, K, Wolff, GB (2008) Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency and Sovereign Ris 
Premia, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 55(4), 465-487. 
Berry WD, Lowery D (1987) Understanding U.S. Government Growth: An Empirical Analysis of the Post-War 
Era. New York: Praeger.  
Brown TA (2006) Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research. New York: Guilford Press. 
Browne M, Cudeck R (1993) Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In: Testing Structural Equation Models. 
Bollen KA, Long JS eds, 136–162. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage  
Buchana JM (1967) The fiscal illusion. Public finance in democratic process: fiscal institutions and individual 
choice, Chapel Hill (USA) University of North Carolina press.  
Choi I (2001) Unit Root Tests for Panel Data, Journal of International Money and Finance, 20: 249–272 
Clotfelter C (1976) Public Spending for Higher Education: An Empirical Test of Two Hypotheses. Public 
Finance 31(2): 177-95. 
Curran P J, West S G, Finch J F (1996) The robustness of test statistics to nonnormality and specification error in 
confirmatory factor analysis. Psychological Methods, 1: 16-29. 
Dell’Anno R (2007) Shadow Economy in Portugal: an analysis with the MIMIC approach. Journal of Applied 
Economics 10(2): 253-277. 
Dell’Anno R, Gòmez de Antonio M, Alanon Pardo A. (2007) Shadow Economy in three different Mediterranean 
Countries: France, Spain and Greece. A MIMIC Approach. Empirical Economics, 33(1): 51-84 
Dell’Anno R, Mourão P (2012) Fiscal Illusion around the World. An analysis using the Structural Equation 
Approach. Public Finance Review, 40(2): 270-299. 
Dell’Anno R, Solomon O. (2008). Shadow economy and the unemployment rate in the USA is there a structural 
relationship? - An empirical analysis with structural equation model. Applied Economics 40(19): 2537-
2555. 
Dollery, B. E. and Worthington, A. C.(1996) The empirical analysis of fiscal illusion. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 10(3), 261–298, 1996.  
Dollery BE, Worthington A (1999) Tax complexity and fiscal illusion: An empirical evaluation of the Heyndels 
and Smolders approach. Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 51(4): 522-533. 
Duncan OD (1975) Introduction to Structural Equation Models. New York: Academic Press. 
Enrick N (1964) A Further Study of Income Tax Consciousness. National Tax Journal, 17: 169-73. 
Fasiani M (1941) Principii di scienza felle finanze, vol. I. Torino: Giappichelli Editore. 
Frey B, Weck-Hannemann H (1984) The hidden economy as an “unobservable” variable. European Economic 
Review 26: 33–53 
Granger CWJ, Newbold P (1974) Spurious regressions in econometrics. Journal of Econometrics 2: 111–120. 
 27 
Hu L, Bentler PM, Kano Y (1988) Can test statistics in covariance structure analysis be trusted?. Psychological 
Bulletin 112: 351-362. 
Jöreskog KG (1967) Some contributions to maximum likelihood factor analysis. Psychometrika, 32(4): 443-482 
Jöreskog KG (1969) A general approach to confirmatory maximum likelihood factor analysis. Psychometrika, 
34: 183–202. 
Jöreskog KG, Sörbom D, du Toit S, du Toit M (2000) LISREL 8: New Statistical Features. Chicago: Scientific 
Software International. 
Jöreskog KG, Goldberger A (1975) Estimation of a model with multiple indicators and multiple causes of a 
single latent variable, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 70: 631-639. 
Levin A, Lin CF (1993) Unit root test in panel data: new results. Department of Economics Discussion paper 
University of California at San Diego, Discussion paper, 93- 56. 
Levin A, Lin CF, Chu C (2002) Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite-Sample Properties.  
Journal of Econometrics, 108: 1-24. 
Maddala GS, Wu S (1999) A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with Panel Data and a New Simple Test, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61: 631-652. 
McCulloch JR (1975) A Treatise on the Practical lnfluence of Taxation and the Funding System. Original edition 
1845, reprint D. P. O'Brien (ed.), Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press. 
Mill JS (1848) Principles of Political Economy. Consulted Edition: Mill, John Stuart .1994. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Mourão P (2008) Towards a Puviani’s Fiscal Illusion Index. Hacienda Publica Espanola 187(4): 49-86. 
Muthén B, Kaplan D (1985) A comparison of methodologies for the factor analysis of non-normal Likert 
variables. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 38: 171-189. 
Muthén B, Kaplan D (1992) A comparison of some methodologies for the factor analysis of non-normal Likert 
variables: A note on the size of the model. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 
45: 19-30. 
Oates WE (1988) On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey. In Taxation and Fiscal 
Federalism: Essays in Honour of Russell Mathews, G. Brennan et al., eds., 65-82, Sydney: Australian 
National University Press. 
Olsson U H, Foss T, Troye S V, Howell R D (2000) The Performance of ML, GLS, and WLS Estimation in 
Structural Equation Modeling under Conditions of Misspecification and Nonnormality. Structural 
Equation Modeling 7(4): 557-595. 
Pommerehne W, Schneider F (1978) Fiscal Illusion, Political Institutions, and Local Public Spending. Kyklos 31: 
381-408. 
 Satorra A, Bentler P M (1994) Correctios to test statistics and standard errors in covariance structure analysis, in 
Latent variable Analysis in Developmental Research, 285-305 (A. van Eye and C. C. Clogg, eds.), 
SAGE Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Sausgruber R,  Tyran J (2005)  Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion. Public Choice, 122(1): 39-68. 
Schmölders G (1960) Das Irrationale in der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft. Reinbeck: Rowohlt. 
 28 
Schneider F, (2005) Shadow economies around the world: What do we really know. European Journal of 
Political Economy, 21: 598-642. 
Stapleton D (1978) Analyzing political participation data with a MIMIC Model. Sociological Methodology, 15: 
52-74. 
Steiger JH, Lind JC (1980) Statistically-based tests for the number of common factors. Paper presented at the 
annual Spring Meeting of the Psychometric Society in Iowa City. May 30, 1980. 
Tirole J (2011) Illiquidity and all its friends. Journal of Economic Literature.  49(2): 287-325. 
Wagner R (1976) Revenue structure, fiscal illusion and budgetary choice. Public Choice 25: 45-61. 
Wagner R (2001) From the politics of illusion to the high cost of regulation. Public Interest 3 (8): June. 
Wagstaff V (1965) Income tax consciousness under withholding. Southern Economic Journal. 32: 73-80. 
Weck-Hannemann H (1983) Schattenwirtschaft: Eine Möglichkeit zur Einschränkung der öffentlichen 
Verwaltung? Eine ökonomische Analyse. Finanzwissenschaftliche Schriften, vol. 22. Lang: 
Bern/Frankfurt.  
 29 
Appendix 1: Sources of data 
 Name Source Max Min Mean Obs 
X1 
Self-
employment 
rate 
Self-employed in % of total employment. (lfsi_grt_a-
Employment growth and activity branches - Annual 
averages) - EUROSTAT 
45.7 5.3 15.9 378 
X2 
Political 
pressures 
and controls 
on media 
Sub-index B of the overall index of Freedom of the Press. 
Freedom House. To have homogenous data, from 1994 to 
2001 the index is equal to sub-indexes B + D 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=274) 
33.0 0.0 7.9 392 
X3 
Tertiary 
school 
enrolment 
Persons with upper secondary or tertiary education 
attainment by age and sex (%) on 25 years and over 
(edat_lfse_08) - EUROSTAT 
86.1 14.6 61.2 350 
X4 
Tax 
Revenue in 
% of GDP 
Total receipts from taxes and social contributions (including 
imputed social contributions) after deduction of amounts 
assessed but unlikely to be collected. (gov_a_tax_ag-Main 
national accounts tax aggregates) - EUROSTAT 
69.5 25.6 38.0 389 
 
      
Y1 Inflation rate 
Annual average rate of change of Harmonized indices of 
Consumer Prices (HICP) - EUROSTAT 154.9 -1.1 4.6 335 
Y2 Public Debt 
General Government consolidated gross debt in % of GDP. 
(gov_dd_edpt1-Government deficit/surplus, debt and 
associated data – EUROSTAT) 
130.4 3.8 48.4 383 
Y3 
Normalised 
Herfindahl 
Index of 
Revenue 
Tax revenues (Rji) refer to: Value added type taxes 
(VAT)/tot.rev.(TR); Import duties/TR; Taxes on imports 
excluding VAT and import duties/TR; Taxes on products, 
except VAT and import taxes/ TR; Other taxes on 
production/TR; Taxes on income/TR; Other current 
taxes/TR; Capital taxes/TR; Employers' actual social 
contributions/TR; Employees' social contributions/TR; 
Social contributions by self- and non-employed persons/TR; 
Imputed social contributions/TR. 
(gov_a_tax_ag-Main national accounts tax aggregates) - 
EUROSTAT. 
34.8 7.6 13.6 389 
Y4 
Ratio 
between 
indirect and 
direct taxes 
revenues 
Taxes on production and imports in % of GDP/ Current 
taxes on income, wealth, etc. in % of GDP (gov_a_tax_ag-
Main national accounts tax aggregates) -EUROSTAT 
352.7 50.2 126.8 389 
Y5 
Taxation on 
labour 
Ratio of taxes and social security contributions on employed 
labour income to total compensation of employees (Implicit 
tax rate on labour) [tsiem070 – EUROSTAT] 
47.8 17.8 35.2 381 
Y6 
Withholding 
taxes from 
wages 
Taxes on labour, of which on employed paid by employers 
[tax_lab_empr]/Taxes on labour, of which on employed paid 
by employees [tax_lab_empe] ([gov_a_tax_str] – 
EUROSTAT) 
240.7 2.1 89.2 392 
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